At least there is no clear evidence that moral values are inherited; it is also likely that cultural values overwhelm any innate values. This logically points to a link between morality and ideology
ADEREMI MEDUPIN
A dubious declaration of divergence between economics and morality
I almost fell into coma when I stumbled on the following entry in a publication authored by Lim Chin which appeared in the February 1989 edition of the International Journal of Social Economics, titled “Morality and Economics”, stating, that:
Economic theory rests on the principal axiom of egoism; that ¹ action is driven by self- interest, and is therefore seen as a moral-free science. Morality, on the other hand, concerns subjective value judgement, usually in the interpersonal context of whether an action is right or wrong.
So is our discipline, economics, is classified so offhandedly as amoral! Without prejudice to a planned future theme on the greatest economists in history among whom we list Adam Smith, we here recall that he foresaw that economic gain could corrupt the economic process in part because its material benefits have the capacity to separate the impartial observer from a moral compass. In other words, the richer we become the harder it is to take a disinterested moral position that might undermine our individual gains. Going by popular definition, morality refers to a code of conduct, about what actions are considered right and what is wrong. The question, therefore, is this: Can economics be divorced of moral considerations? Painfully, perspectives differ on what constitutes the correct answer.
Is their ethics in economics?
In a way, our theme throws up the question: Is their ethics in economics? It is instructive to read the position of Ricardo F. Crespo in his piece, “Controversy: Is Economics a Moral Science?”, published in the Journal of Markets & Morality 1, no. 2 (October 1998) on the central issue of the connection between economics and morality-exposing the reality of their convergence as well as the onset of their divergence as the author asserts confidently, that: Economics, to put it bluntly, is a moral science. Of course, this may sound brazen to some, especially to economists who are used to conceiving of their science as value-free.
The point made here is not that economics is reducible to ethics. It only means that economics is not a value-free science. In this vein, what is important to note is that economic ethics is the combination of economics and ethics that unites value judgements from both disciplines to predict, analyze, and model economic phenomena. It encompasses the theoretical ethical prerequisites and foundations of economic systems. In practical terms, it is the enacting of moral principles into economic actions, such that, for example, if one holds the principle that all people should be compensated fairly for their labour, then one should support policies that advance that principle, such as instituting a minimum wage that meets the requirements of a living wage.
Adam Smith, often touted as the father of economics, has a lot to offer on our theme especially from his text on Theory of Moral Sentiments, in which he shows that our moral ideas and actions are a product of our very nature as social creatures. He argued that this social psychology is a better guide to moral action than is reason. As ably summarized by Eamonn Butler, Adam Smith was able to forge a link between self-interest and sympathy, noting how “as individuals, we have a natural tendency to look after ourselves. That is merely prudence. And yet as social creatures, we are also endowed with a natural sympathy or now more commonly called empathy”. Morality, says Smith, is not something we have to calculate; it is natural, built into us as social beings. When we see people happy or sad, we feel happy or sad too. We derive pleasure when people do things we approve of, and distress when we believe they are doing harm. In other words, morality stems from our social nature. Gradually, as we grow from childhood to adulthood, we each learn what is and is not acceptable to other people. In his January 14, 2013 essay on “What Would Adam Smith Say About Morals and Markets?”, on the platform of Institutions & Governance, Gail Fosler provided a nuanced reading of Adam Smith’s personality with the submission that: To be sure, Smith was more optimistic than many today about the benefits of free market outcomes, but he was by no means an economic ideologue. He was at his roots a moral philosopher, and an accidental economist. For Smith, human beings are essentially social animals, and economic activity was but a part of the very rich spectrum of human experience
It is pertinent to remember that Smith was professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow from 1752 to 1764. He published his first major treatise, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in 1759. Again I seek permission to cite Gail Foster as he noted how Smith saw that economic systems based on private property would create social tensions that required governing systems. Markets in Smith’s economic world operate with a machine-like precision of closely interrelated parts. Still, no one walks away from a machine and leaves it running. Machines need to be calibrated and maintained. Markets (like people) are not only not self-regulating, they are prone to excess and abuse. As such, both men and markets require a moral framework for personal behaviour and a set of governance rules that regulate the relative power and economic behaviour among groups. He goes further to recall that: There is no “greed is good” in Adam Smith — quite the contrary. While Smith was a realist in recognizing the compelling human attraction to social status and wealth, he did not condone it. This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and powerful…though necessary both to establish and to maintain the distinction…of the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments. Adam Smith’s position and mistrust of governments in general derives from a conviction that, “In many governments the candidates for highest stations are above the law; and, if they can attain the object of their ambition, have no fear of being called to account for the means by which they acquired it … they more frequently miscarry than succeed.” Those familiar with the Nigerian reality will easily see this picture as a perfect representation of the legendary phenomenon of impunity. Of course, lack of accountability in public life can distort or, in the extreme, corrupt the outcomes that society ultimately gets. As Fosler recalls, one of the most powerful of Smith’s moral concepts is that of the impartial spectator — the third eye, as it were, which represents a consolidation of social values that forms a communal conscience to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. In the analogy, the impartial spectator tells us what to do when no one else is looking. Of particular relevance to our social context is that Smith foresaw that economic gain could corrupt the economic process in part because its material benefits have the capacity to separate the impartial observer from a moral compass. In other words, the richer we become the harder it is to take a disinterested moral position that might undermine our individual gains.
A discourse at this level of expose on Adam Smith without reference to the views of Karl Marx would be a disservice to both the reader and our subject. After all, both titans are usually lumped together as classical economists, albeit with a differential note. This is why it must be appreciated that unlike Adam Smith, Karl Marx viewed morality as most other social phenomena above the micro plane of the individual-though not totally ignored-to the macro plane of the system. In essence, his focus was more on the universal than the particular. For example, Marx devoted ample attention to the role that morality plays in helping to sustain the existing social order, in form of ideology. In his mimeograph, “The Marxist Critique of Morality and the Theory of Ideology”, Michael Rosen highlighted some dimensions of Marx’s view of morality, out of which two register direct relevance, namely: (i) his attitude towards the moral principles and ethical beliefs actually at work in a particular society – that is, its “ethical life”, for want of a better vocabulary; and (ii) his attitude towards the content of the moral doctrines advocated by moral philosophers within that society (which may or may not correspond directly to its ethical life). Building on the position of preceding philosophers, notably Hegel, Marx endorsed the view that that “we act in accordance with moral rationality only if we act from the motive of duty (rather than from contingent, personal ends)”.
In my understanding, the effective road to a true understanding and proper appreciation of Marx’s thesis on morality is to start from the point of his aversion to hypocrisy and pretentious righteousness. A departure from this basic foundational premise may lead one to a misinterpretation of his insistence that "moral postulates" are, by their very nature, ideological. In effect, Marx rejected the idea that moral rules have a divine source and are imposed on human society from the outside. This helps to explain the position of Phil Gasper, in the piece, “Marxism, morality, and human nature”, published in the International Socialist Review (Number 82), quoting a story told by the German socialist and philosopher, Karl Vörlander on how: “The moment anyone started to talk to Marx about morality, he would roar with laughter.” Gasper’s reaction to the reported laughter is interesting as it rings a bell; hear him: I don’t know whether Vörlander’s story is true, but there is certainly plenty to laugh about when our rulers talk about morality. Almost invariably they use it as a way of promoting their own interests, pretending they are acting for the common good or for the benefit of humanity.
Gasper recalls how, in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and elsewhere, Marx starts with a very different understanding of human nature. In this conception, we are not naturally competitive, rather, we are social creatures who cannot survive without cooperating with each other. Modern science confirms this view, which shows that humans did not evolve as a collection of atomized individuals constantly at war with one another, but in social groups that depended on mutual support. In this vein, it is pertinent to highlight the fact that some of the things we take for granted as incontestable truisms actually portray blindness to human history. For example, history shows that “human beings are not naturally violent, selfish, competitive, greedy, or xenophobic, it is not natural for human societies to be organized hierarchically or for women to have lower social status than men, and capitalism does not exist because it uniquely reflects human nature, as its defenders often claim” After all, according to the anthropologist Richard Lee: Before the rise of the state and the entrenchment of social inequality, people lived for millennia in small-scale kin-based social groups, in which the core institutions of economic life included collective or common ownership of land and resources, generalized reciprocity in the distribution of food, and relatively egalitarian political relations.
This citation is the kernel of the notion of a moral economy. As explained on the platform of Global South Studies by Jaime Moreno-Tejada, “moral economies are systems of exchange based on customary practice, which is assumed to be fair and equitable in relation to modern economic behavior”. Going down memory lane, the author recalled how the idea of the moral economy dates back to Antiquity. To be specific, it is present in Aristotle and in a sense is central to the philosophy of Confucius. Also, Chinese economist Li Yining has published extensively on market “regulation by custom and morality”. We recall Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s writing in the Encyclopédie, that: “Economy... originally means the wise and legitimate government of the home, for the common good of the whole family”. Concrete references in recent years to the concept of “moral economy” can be seen in mainstream politics. For example, in 2020, Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador published a book entitled Hacia una economía moral (Toward a Moral Economy). The volume introduces a “code of conduct” against corruption and the excesses of neoliberalism. In another highly visible example, in 2016, US politician Bernie Sanders referred to “the need for a moral economy” in the effort to reduce wealth disparity.
To tie the loose ends of the discourse, I am convinced that humans are born as blank slates, with no built-in values; they are developed in extant societies of human beings with governments that emerged over time playing background but important roles. At least there is no clear evidence that moral values are inherited; it is also likely that cultural values overwhelm any innate values. This logically points to a link between morality and ideology
.Morality and ideology
An ideology is a system of beliefs or doctrines serving to guide social groups or individuals, most often with political or sociological connotations. Through this prism, we see clearly that ideology and morality are interconnected because most people subscribe to a certain ideology based on their moral convictions, even if not necessarily true at all times. A convenient and useful point of exploring the link between morality and ideology is consider how it is possible for there to be class societies in which the majority of the population is socially conditioned to accept its exploitation and oppression. This takes us back to our friend, Karl Marx who, right from the onset was opposed to exploitation and oppression; hence, from his earliest writings he condemned capitalism as “inhumane—a society in which most human beings cannot live satisfying lives, engage in fulfilling work, or relate in satisfactory ways to other people or to the rest of the natural world. In other words, capitalism frustrates basic human needs and human nature”. This is why he wrote a great deal in support of his conviction that capitalism is an irrational, inhuman, and obsolete social system that should be overthrown. To be blunt, Marx frequently used moralistic language within his writings, in conformity with his humanistic ideals. It is therefore baseless to claim that his theory of social change is amoral
One fact that cannot be denied is that there is no such thing as universal morals that apply to all societies in all historical periods. This is because, as argued by Douglas Bell in the paper on “Marxism and Morality”: “any moral values and ideologies must arise from particular religious belief and/or practical experiences”. In other words, the notion of moral universalism is untenable; rather, morality is the product of social construction. In the doctoral thesis, MARX AND MORALITY, submitted to the University of Pittsburgh, in 2011, Vanessa Wills has the following relevant entry: Famously, Marx refers to morality as "ideology". Interpreters of Marx have assumed that ideology is always reactionary or misleading. However, ideology plays an important role in the development of revolutionary consciousness. Ideology can serve as a bulwark of reaction; however, Marx shows that the proletariat must develop its own ideology to theorize social contradictions and determine how they can be overcome to allow for a conscious, democratic, and rational control over human beings' social existence.
The influence of ideology can be seen in how “members of the dominated group act against their own interests and in the service of the interests of the dominant group”, such that the consequences of the dominated person’s action favour the dominant much more than he himself. In more general terms, we see instances where ideologies contribute to injustice or oppression through the self-justification of power. For one thing, moral judgments are often driven by political beliefs. Empirically, a study by Peter K. Hatemi, Charles Crabtree and Kevin B. Smith published in the October 2019 issue of the American Journal of Political Science, titled “Ideology Justifies Morality: Political Beliefs Predict Moral Foundations” found “consistent evidence supporting the hypothesis that ideology predicts moral intuitions”. Individuals often face dilemmas in which non-cooperation serves their self-interest and cooperation favours society at large. In this vein, we acknowledge, in agreement with Laura C. Hoenig, Ruthie Pliskin and Carsten K. W. De Dreu in their article, “Political ideology and moral dilemmas in public good provision”, published in Scientific Reports, Volume 13, 2023, that: Individuals often face dilemmas in which non-cooperation serves their self-interest and cooperation favors society at large. Cooperation is often considered the moral choice because it creates equality and fairness among citizens. Accordingly, individuals whose political ideology attaches greater value to equality than to agency and self-reliance should not only cooperate on more rather than less efficient public goods, but also more on public goods from which individuals benefit equally rather than unequally
For analytical convenience and ease of reference for dialogue, my suggestion is that we give primary status to the fact that no individual can be anything outside the context of human collaboration-starting with the basic skill of language, the foundation of serious communication.
In the beginning, economics was ethical
As implied earlier, economics did not begin as a science independent of ethics; this was brought into bold relief through Adam Smith who was both a moral philosopher and an economist. He made no attempt to draw a sharp line between ethics and economics, or to keep the two separate. In the article “Moral Economy: The Afterlife of a Nebulous Concept”, published in the Journal for the Study of Religion 35, 2 (2022), Asonzeh Ukah made the interesting point cited hereunder at length, that:
Religion, economics, and morality share some properties in common, one of which is the attempt to live a good life in a humane and meaningful environment and sense. All three domains of human activities, also in their different ways determine and prescribe what counts as value. In other words, they constitute sources of value for individuals. Religious beliefs and worldviews supply justifications and principles for living a moral or ethical life. Broadly, the economy concerns the means and method of making a livelihood through the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services, while religion deals with how humans relate to other-worldly entities and the infrastructures that enable and sustain this relationship. Both spheres focus on managing human uncertainty and vulnerability of the unknown and the unknowable, rooted in or emerging from human fallibility and limitations. All these spheres of social life (religion, morality, and economics) overlap in significant ways in principle and practice.
The critical takeaway from this is that even a behaviour such as selfishness is determined by specific social, political, cultural and material circumstances; it is not innate. It should not be difficult for the reader to see that this is the historic basis for the growing divergence between economics and morality.
The tragedy of the divergence
History shows that where ethics and economics come in conflict, victory is always with economics. This is because, vested interests have never been known to have willingly divested themselves unless there was sufficient force to compel them. An extreme case of the divergence is represented by the reportedly leaked memo highlighted by Wikipedia, concerning a submission allegedly penned by Lawrence Harry Summers, an American economist who served as the 71st United States Secretary of the treasury, explaining that:
The Summers memo was a 1991 memo on trade liberalization that was written by Lant Pritchett and signed by Lawrence Summers who was then Chief Economist of the World Bank. It included a section that both Summers and Pritchett say was sarcastic that suggested dumping toxic waste in third-world countries for perceived economic benefits. After the material was leaked by Roberto Smeraldi of Friends of the Earth to Jornal do Brasil on February 2, 1992. Pritchett (who worked under Summers) stated that he had written the memo and Summers had only signed it, and that it was intended to be "sarcastic". According to Pritchett, the memo as leaked was doctored to remove context and intended irony, and was "a deliberate fraud and forgery to discredit Larry and the World Bank".
As if to silence the denial of the criminal memo in afterthought manner, the New York Times of February 7, 1992, under the caption:” Furor on Memo at World Bank”, reproduced relevant sections of the memo, reading: "A given amount of health-impairing pollution should be done in the country with the lowest cost, which will be the country with the lowest wages," said the memo, which was obtained from a critic of the World Bank's environmental record. "I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that." This is an indicting evidence of the practical enactment of the divorce of morality from economics. Mahatma Gandhi’s observation provides a critical insight into the logic of economics divorced form morality, which is that: large-scale production was meant to be profit-oriented and therefore, harmful for society as it could lead to concentration of wealth and power in a few hands. In this vein, Gandhi advocated decentralisation because it could avoid violence. The reader should recall Gandhi's compassion for and views about the poorest of the poor of society. He believed that nobody would be left wanting if everyone used just as much as was needed by him. His economic views were humanitarian in nature stemming from his concern for the toiling peasants, factory workers and joblessness. Based on the foregoing, our verdict is that economics became increasingly disconnected from and emptied of its original moral content with the rise and global embrace of the neoclassical paradigm with sole focus on efficiency and scant regard for the moral imperative. I come in peace, please.
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